Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Governance: How Firms Restructure Their Governance Strategies Under Policy Uncertainty
Abstract
Policy uncertainty has become a defining feature of the contemporary corporate environment. Elections, trade disputes, geopolitical realignments, and rapidly shifting regulatory regimes force firms across industries and geographies to reconsider how they govern themselves and how they manage relationships with employees, stakeholders, and the broader institutional environment. This paper examines how corporations restructure their governance strategies in response to policy uncertainty, with particular attention to the trust deficits that emerge within organizations during periods of regulatory volatility. Drawing on resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and agency theory, the paper traces how uncertainty affects corporate decision-making, board composition, risk governance, and internal communication structures. Real-world examples from firms operating under Brexit-related disruption, geopolitical trade tensions, and pandemic-era regulatory flux illustrate the mechanisms through which governance changes occur. The paper concludes with a set of practical advisories for workplace managers who must maintain functional, trust-based work environments even when the external policy landscape is unstable.
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFReferences
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593–1636. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw024
Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica, 77(3), 623–685. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA6248
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizations. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101
Dirks, K. T., & Ferrin, D. L. (2002). Trust in leadership: Meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 611–628. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.611
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96(1), 369–386. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157704
Gulen, H., & Ion, M. (2016). Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. Review of Financial Studies, 29(3), 523–564. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv050
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Julio, B., & Yook, Y. (2012). Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. Journal of Finance, 67(1), 45–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01707.x
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080335
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Harper & Row.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. Free Press.



