

Skill Polarization in the Digital Economy: Human Capital Outcomes and Development Gaps in Hybrid Economic Systems

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ABSTRACT

The spread of digital technologies across labor markets is doing more than automating tasks. It is actively sorting workers into two poles: those with high-level cognitive and digital skills, and those trapped in low-wage, low-security employment. This paper examines how skill polarization in the digital economy produces uneven human capital outcomes, with particular attention to what happens in hybrid economies, where formal and informal labor coexist alongside digital and traditional production systems. Drawing on established theories of skill-biased technological change, task-based models of labor demand, and human capital theory, the paper traces how middle-skill employment has eroded across both developed and developing economies. It also draws attention to trust deficits that emerge inside workplaces when digital transitions are managed poorly, including how algorithmic management, surveillance-linked remote work, and exclusionary upskilling programs breed resentment and disengage workers. The paper closes with a set of concrete advisories for workplace managers, covering transparent communication, inclusive skill development, participatory governance, and psychological safety, with practical guidance on how to put each advisory to work.

Keywords: Skill polarization, digital economy, human capital, hybrid economies, trust deficit, algorithmic management, workforce development

INTRODUCTION

Labor markets are not neutral. They reflect the technologies, institutions, and power arrangements of their time. The current period is no exception. Since the 1990s, the spread of digital technologies has quietly reshaped who does what at work, which skills command a premium, and which workers find themselves increasingly redundant or economically marginalized.

The phenomenon now widely studied as skill polarization describes a hollowing out of the labor market. Middle-skill, routine-intensive jobs, whether in manufacturing, clerical work, or mid-level services, have declined steadily. What has grown instead is employment at both ends of the skill distribution. High-skill, high-wage jobs in professional services, technology, and finance have expanded. So have low-skill, low-wage jobs in personal services, care work, and delivery. The middle has thinned.

For economies that are neither fully industrialized nor fully digital, the consequences are more complicated. These are what this paper refers to as hybrid economies: settings where informal and formal labor markets coexist, where digital infrastructure is unevenly distributed, and where workers face the pressures of global digital competition without access to the training, institutions, or social protection systems that could help them adapt. Countries such as India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Brazil, and the Philippines present clear examples of this kind of duality.

Inside workplaces, the same digital transition is producing a less-studied but equally consequential problem: eroding trust. When employers deploy surveillance tools to monitor remote workers, when algorithmic systems make decisions that workers cannot see or contest, and when upskilling programs benefit only select employees, they introduce what this paper calls trust deficits. These are conditions where workers distrust the intentions or competence of management, withdraw discretionary effort, or disengage altogether. Trust deficits are not merely a cultural problem. They produce measurable drops in productivity, innovation, and retention.

This paper brings these two conversations together. It traces how skill polarization and digital transitions interact to produce unequal human capital outcomes in hybrid economies, and then it turns to the workplace itself to examine the trust deficits that poorly managed digital transitions create. It closes with a set of advisories for workplace managers who want to handle these transitions more thoughtfully, including practical steps for implementing each advisory.

SKILL POLARIZATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: THE THEORETICAL GROUND

Routine-Biased Technological Change

The intellectual foundation for understanding skill polarization comes largely from the work of David Autor and his collaborators. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) argued that the key to understanding how technology affects employment is not whether a job is high-skill or low-skill, but whether it consists of routine or non-routine tasks. Routine tasks, they showed, are those that can be encoded in explicit rules and therefore automated. Computers and digital systems excel at these. Non-routine tasks, by contrast, require judgment, flexibility, creativity, or physical dexterity in unpredictable environments, things that are much harder to automate.

This insight reframed decades of debate about technology and work. It explained why bank tellers declined while financial advisors grew. Why data entry clerks disappeared while data scientists multiplied. Why assembly line workers faced displacement while both surgeons and home health aides remained in demand. The common thread was not education level per se, but task content.

Job Polarization: The Empirical Picture

Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) brought this framework to European labor markets with rigorous empirical evidence. Looking at sixteen European countries over two decades, they documented a systematic pattern: employment in high-wage, high-skill occupations and in low-wage, low-skill occupations both grew, while employment in middle-wage occupations fell. Importantly, they showed that both routine-biased technological change and offshoring contributed to this polarization, though technology was the dominant driver.

The same pattern appeared in the United States and, with varying intensities, in many middle-income countries. The jobs that disappeared were not randomly distributed. They were concentrated among workers who had modest levels of formal education, had entered stable middle-income occupations through on-the-job skill accumulation, and had few ready alternatives when their roles were automated or offshored.

The Task Framework and Human Capital

Acemoglu and Autor (2011) extended this analysis into what they called a task-based framework. Rather than thinking about human capital as a single stock of skill that technology either complements or substitutes, they argued that we need to think about which specific tasks humans perform versus which tasks machines perform, and how that boundary shifts over time. As technology improves, machines take on tasks previously done by humans, and the boundary of automation expands.

This has direct implications for how we think about human capital investment. If education and training systems continue to produce workers whose main skills lie in routine cognitive tasks, such workers are being prepared for jobs that are contracting. The mismatch between what education systems supply and what digital labor markets demand is one of the most pressing structural problems facing hybrid economies today.

Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) took this argument a step further. In their assessment, digital technologies are advancing rapidly enough that a growing range of non-routine tasks, including some forms of medical diagnosis, legal research, and financial analysis, are becoming susceptible to automation. The implication is that even some high-skill workers are not as protected as previously assumed. The pace of technological change may be outrunning the ability of human capital institutions to respond.

The Education-Technology Race

Goldin and Katz (2008) framed this dynamic as a race between education and technology. For much of the twentieth century, rising educational attainment in the United States broadly kept pace with the skill demands of a changing economy. When that race slowed, when educational expansion failed to keep up with technological change, wage inequality widened. Their analysis implies that the current period of rapid digital advance requires a corresponding acceleration in the quality, relevance, and accessibility of education and training. That acceleration has not happened in most hybrid economies.

HUMAN CAPITAL IN HYBRID ECONOMIES

What Makes an Economy Hybrid

The term hybrid economy, as used in this paper, refers to economic systems where multiple modes of production, different levels of technological development, and both formal and informal labor markets coexist within the same national boundaries. This is not simply a euphemism for developing countries. Many emerging economies, and even some advanced ones, display this duality: a relatively small, highly productive formal sector operating with digital infrastructure, integrated into global value chains, existing alongside a large informal sector characterized by low productivity, limited technological access, and weak institutional protection.

Countries like India, South Africa, Brazil, the Philippines, and Indonesia are archetypal examples. In each, a modern digital service sector coexists with vast informal labor markets in agriculture, petty trade, domestic work, and informal manufacturing. The structural challenge is not simply that some workers are left behind. It is that the structural conditions, labor laws, training infrastructure, and social protection systems, which might allow workers to move from the informal to the formal economy, are themselves often weak or inaccessible.

Human Capital Theory and Its Limits in Hybrid Settings

The conventional economic approach to workforce development rests on human capital theory, most influentially articulated by Becker (1964) and later extended by Mincer (1974). The core argument is that individuals invest in education and training to raise their productivity and therefore their earnings. Employers invest in training when it raises worker productivity in ways the firm can capture. The theory is elegant, but it rests on assumptions that do not hold cleanly in hybrid economies.

In a well-functioning labor market with good information and accessible financing, workers can accurately assess which skills are worth acquiring and can fund their acquisition of those skills. In a hybrid economy, information about skill demands is often poor, credit markets for education investment are thin, and returns to formal education may be highly compressed for workers in the informal sector. The result

is underinvestment in human capital at precisely the moment when digital transitions are making the stakes of that investment higher.

Automation, Development Gaps, and the Polarization Trap

Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) examined how automation affects factor shares and employment, making a distinction between tasks that machines replace and tasks that remain human-intensive. Their analysis showed that automation can actually reduce labor demand, not just shift it, if the creation of new tasks that are uniquely human does not keep pace with the displacement of old ones. For hybrid economies, this creates a particularly sharp risk.

The World Bank's World Development Report 2016, focused specifically on digital dividends, drew attention to this paradox. Digital technologies had spread rapidly across developing countries in terms of connectivity and platform access, but the expected productivity gains and job creation benefits were uneven. They accrued disproportionately to workers and firms that already had complementary assets, education, infrastructure, and institutional quality. Workers without those assets found that the digital economy was not a ladder but a sorting mechanism: one that moved the skilled up and left others in lower-productivity niches.

The development gap that emerges from skill polarization in hybrid economies is therefore not simply a wage gap. It is a structural gap in the conditions under which human capital can be built, deployed, and rewarded. Workers in the informal sector may gain access to mobile phones and internet connectivity, but they remain shut out of the formal training systems, credentialing pathways, and employer networks that would allow them to convert digital access into economic opportunity.

TRUST DEFICITS IN DIGITAL AND HYBRID WORKPLACES

Trust in Organizational Settings

Trust is not a luxury in organizational life. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) developed what remains the most widely cited integrative model of organizational trust. They defined trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another, based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor. Their model identifies three key antecedents: the trustee's perceived ability, their benevolence toward the trustor, and their integrity. When digital transitions undermine any of these perceptions, trust breaks down.

Edmondson (1999) introduced the related concept of psychological safety, the shared belief among team members that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking. Teams with high psychological safety speak up, share errors, and adapt more quickly. Psychological safety is closely related to trust, and both are fragile under conditions of surveillance, algorithmic control, and perceived unfairness in how digital transitions are managed.

Real-Life Use Cases of Trust Deficits in Digital Workplaces

The following cases illustrate how trust deficits form in practice across different types of digital work environments.

Case 1: Surveillance and Remote Work at Large Corporations

When the COVID-19 pandemic pushed millions of employees into remote work, many companies responded by deploying employee monitoring software. Tools that tracked keystrokes, took periodic screenshots, logged application usage, or required workers to keep cameras on throughout the workday became common. The logic from management's side was straightforward: without physical oversight, productivity needed to be verified.

The effect on workers was predictable and well-documented in practice if less so in formal literature. Employees reported feeling treated as suspects rather than professionals. In surveys conducted after large-scale remote work implementations, workers at companies that used invasive monitoring tools consistently reported lower job satisfaction, higher stress levels, and reduced loyalty to their employer. The message implicit in constant surveillance is that management does not trust workers to do their jobs, and workers reciprocate by withdrawing discretionary effort and commitment.

Bloom, Liang, Roberts, and Ying (2015) examined remote work outcomes in a controlled study at a Chinese call center and found that home workers were significantly more productive than their office-based peers, but only under conditions where they had adequate support and autonomy. Their productivity gains came without surveillance, but from better work conditions and autonomy over their immediate environment. The contrast with surveillance-heavy approaches is telling: autonomy builds trust and improves performance; surveillance substitutes for trust and generally undermines it.

Case 2: Algorithmic Management in the Gig Economy

Platform-based gig work in companies like Uber, Lyft, and Deliveroo has introduced a form of workplace management with no human manager at all. An algorithm assigns tasks, evaluates performance, sets prices, and can deactivate a worker's account, effectively terminating employment without any human review or conversation.

This is a textbook case of trust deficit by design. The three pillars of trustworthiness identified by Mayer and colleagues, ability, benevolence, and integrity, are systematically absent in the relationship between gig workers and their algorithmic managers. Workers cannot assess whether the algorithm is competent, because its logic is opaque. They cannot believe it acts with benevolence toward them, because it is explicitly optimizing for platform metrics. And they cannot evaluate its integrity, because there is no appeal process and no transparency.

Research on gig workers in India, Indonesia, and Nigeria has documented how this dynamic plays out in hybrid economies. Drivers and delivery workers in cities like Bangalore, Jakarta, and Lagos often describe their relationship with the platform as one of constant anxiety: they must maintain high ratings to stay active, but they do not fully understand how ratings are calculated, how disputes are resolved, or why their pay rates fluctuate. The result is workers who are formally independent but experientially powerless, a combination that produces chronic low-level distrust of the employing institution.

Case 3: Exclusionary Upskilling Programs

A less obvious source of trust deficits is the upskilling program. When organizations roll out training for digital tools, data analysis software, or new workflow systems, the natural instinct is to prioritize high-potential or already-skilled workers. The logic, again, is economically rational: training those who are most likely to use it maximizes return on investment.

But in mixed-skill workplaces, the effect of selective upskilling on those excluded from it is corrosive. Workers who are not included in training programs do not interpret this as a neutral administrative decision. They read it, often correctly, as a signal that management has already classified them as dispensable. The resulting loss of trust takes the form of reduced effort, increased absenteeism, and a sharper us-versus-them culture within the organization.

This pattern is particularly acute in manufacturing and business process outsourcing (BPO) sectors in hybrid economies. In the Philippines, for instance, BPO workers in routine data processing roles have watched more complex analytical functions migrate to specialized units staffed by college graduates from elite universities. Workers who built careers in entry-level BPO work over five to ten years have frequently

reported feeling invisible when their employers announced digital transformation initiatives that clearly did not include them.

Case 4: Technology-Led Restructuring Without Consultation

A recurring theme across industries is the introduction of digital systems without meaningful consultation with the workers whose jobs will be directly affected. In retail banking, for example, the rollout of automated teller systems, then online banking, and now AI-driven customer service tools has often proceeded through top-down announcements rather than collaborative planning. Branch staff learn that their roles have been redesigned not through a conversation but through a memo or, in some cases, by reading about it in the press.

In hybrid economies, where labor organizing is often weaker and workers have fewer institutional channels for voicing concerns, this kind of top-down restructuring produces trust deficits that linger long after the technology transition is complete. Workers who feel they had no voice in a decision that significantly affected their livelihood do not quickly forgive or forget. The residual distrust shapes how they engage with the next round of change, which is usually not well.

DEVELOPMENT GAPS: WHAT SKILL POLARIZATION COSTS HYBRID ECONOMIES

The macroeconomic consequences of skill polarization in hybrid economies compound the workplace-level problems described above. At the national level, a labor market structured around two poles rather than a broad middle class tends to produce rising income inequality, weaker domestic consumption, and reduced intergenerational mobility. These are not abstract statistical concerns. They describe the lived reality of millions of workers in cities like Mumbai, Nairobi, Manila, and Sao Paulo who sit at the border between the formal digital economy and the informal traditional one.

The OECD's Skills Outlook 2019 report on skills in the digital world documented that low-skilled adults in OECD countries were far less likely to participate in employer-sponsored training than their higher-skilled peers, even though the former group had far more to gain from upskilling. The gap was starkest in countries with weaker social protection systems, where employers faced the least institutional pressure to invest in workforce development across skill levels.

In hybrid economies, this dynamic is sharper still. Formal sector employers operating in competitive global markets have a strong incentive to automate, outsource, or offshore middle-skill functions. When they do, the workers displaced from those roles often have nowhere obvious to go. They may return to informal work at lower wages, they may remain unemployed in cities without adequate safety nets, or they may join the growing population of discouraged workers who have left the labor market altogether.

The human capital stock of a hybrid economy also deteriorates at the aggregate level when skill polarization is allowed to proceed without policy intervention. If the signal sent to young workers is that middle-skill occupations no longer offer viable careers, but that access to high-skill occupations requires expensive or inaccessible education, many will rationally invest in neither. They will instead seek short-term income in low-skill niches, foregoing the kind of sustained human capital investment that supports long-term productivity growth.

ADVISORIES FOR WORKPLACE MANAGERS: WHAT TO DO AND HOW TO DO IT

The literature and the case evidence point toward a coherent set of practices that workplace managers in hybrid economies can adopt to manage digital transitions without deepening skill polarization or creating trust deficits. What follows are six specific advisories, each followed by practical implementation guidance.

Advisory 1: Communicate Transparently About Technology Transitions, Before They Happen

Workers who learn about automation or digital restructuring after the fact, through announcements, rumors, or media reports, have no opportunity to prepare, adapt, or raise concerns. Their first reaction is almost always distrust. Managers who communicate early and honestly about what is changing, why it is changing, what it means for existing roles, and what options are available to affected workers give employees something genuinely valuable: agency over their response.

How to implement this:

1. Hold department-level briefings before any technology rollout is announced company-wide. Let workers hear it directly from their immediate manager, not from a corporate email.
2. Be explicit about which roles will be affected, which will not, and what the timeline looks like. Vagueness breeds rumor.
3. Create a standing channel, whether a monthly town hall, an internal forum, or a dedicated communication line, where workers can ask questions and receive honest answers.
4. If some roles will be eliminated, say so clearly and early, and explain what support is available. Workers respect honesty far more than they resent bad news.

Advisory 2: Design Upskilling Programs That Include, Not Just Select

Training programs that target only high-potential or already-skilled employees solve the wrong problem. They improve the productivity of workers who would likely have adapted anyway, while deepening the sense of exclusion among those who most need development support. Inclusive upskilling is not just morally preferable; it is economically smarter, because it protects the organization's broader human capital base and reduces the disruption of high turnover.

How to implement this:

1. Audit current training offerings to see who participates and who does not. Disaggregate by age, tenure, role level, and education background. If participation is concentrated among already-advantaged workers, the program needs redesign.
2. Offer tiered training pathways. Not every worker needs advanced data analytics. But every worker can benefit from digital literacy, new tool familiarization, and an understanding of how the organization's systems are changing.
3. Partner with local training providers, community colleges, or online platforms to give workers flexible learning options that do not require them to sacrifice income or attend during work hours.
4. Provide managers with explicit responsibility for identifying and nominating workers who would not self-nominate for training. Left to self-selection, training enrollment reproduces existing hierarchies.

Advisory 3: Replace Surveillance with Accountability Structures Based on Outcomes

Monitoring tools that track keystrokes, screenshots, or camera presence are fundamentally incompatible with building trust. They signal that management assumes workers will not perform without oversight, and workers respond to that signal accordingly. The alternative is not absence of accountability but a different kind of accountability: one built on agreed outputs, regular check-ins, and shared performance criteria.

How to implement this:

1. Define clear, measurable outputs for each role rather than measuring inputs like hours logged or keystrokes per hour. What does good work look like? Write it down and share it.
2. Schedule regular one-on-one check-ins, not to check whether work is happening but to remove obstacles, give feedback, and understand what the worker needs.
3. If monitoring tools are already in place, review them critically. Ask whether they are actually improving performance or simply satisfying a management anxiety. Remove those that serve the latter purpose.
4. Involve workers in designing accountability frameworks where possible. When people help set the standards they are held to, they own them more fully.

Advisory 4: Introduce Human Oversight Into Algorithmic Management Systems

Where algorithmic management systems are in use, whether for task assignment, performance evaluation, or pay determination, workers need visible human accountability. An algorithm can optimize, but it cannot exercise judgment, recognise context, or take responsibility. When workers have no human point of contact to raise concerns, dispute decisions, or request explanations, the organizational relationship degrades quickly.

How to implement this:

1. Assign named human managers to teams or workers even where algorithmic systems handle routine task assignment. The human manager's role is to handle exceptions, disputes, and development conversations.
2. Create a formal appeals process for algorithmic decisions that affect pay, rating, or job status. Workers should know who reviews appeals, how long the process takes, and what criteria are used.
3. Audit algorithmic outputs periodically for fairness across demographic groups. Algorithms trained on historical data can reproduce historical biases. Human review can catch patterns that the system itself cannot flag.
4. Brief workers on how the algorithm works, what it optimizes for, and what it cannot account for. Opacity is a primary driver of distrust in algorithmic systems.

Advisory 5: Create Participatory Forums for Workers to Shape Digital Transitions

The research on organizational trust consistently shows that procedural fairness, being heard and having one's views considered, matters almost as much as the outcome itself. Workers who feel they had a voice in a decision that affected them are more likely to accept it, even if it is not what they would have chosen. Managers who exclude workers from decisions about technology adoption and then expect smooth implementation are setting themselves up for resistance.

How to implement this:

1. Before rolling out new technology systems, form a working group that includes workers from affected departments, not just managers and IT staff. Task them with reviewing the proposed system, identifying problems, and suggesting adaptations.
2. Act visibly on worker input. If the working group raises a concern that changes the implementation plan, say so publicly. Workers need to see that their participation has consequences, otherwise they stop participating.

3. In hybrid economies with weaker union structures, consider establishing joint consultative committees that give workers a formal channel for raising concerns about technology and skill development.
4. Report back to workers after implementation on how their suggestions were incorporated. Closing the loop reinforces that the consultation was genuine.

Advisory 6: Actively Manage Psychological Safety During Periods of Change

Technology transitions create anxiety, and anxiety suppresses the kind of open communication that organizations most need during periods of change. Workers who fear being seen as resistant, or who worry that asking questions will mark them as incompetent, stay quiet. Errors go unreported. Problems fester. Managers who actively build psychological safety create conditions where teams can work through the difficulties of digital transitions rather than around them.

How to implement this:

1. Model uncertainty at the management level. When senior managers publicly acknowledge that the transition will involve learning, mistakes, and adjustment, they lower the cost of workers admitting the same.
2. Reframe errors made during technology transitions as learning data rather than performance failures. Build this framing into the formal evaluation process during transition periods.
3. Train line managers in recognizing signs of disengagement, which often precede formal attrition, and give them tools to respond before withdrawal becomes irreversible.
4. Regularly check in on team morale with brief, anonymous pulse surveys. Track scores over the transition period and use them as leading indicators of trust, adjusting management practices in response.

CONCLUSION

Skill polarization is one of the more consequential structural shifts associated with the spread of digital technologies, and hybrid economies are among the least equipped to absorb its effects. Workers in the middle of the skill distribution, who built their livelihoods around routine tasks in manufacturing, clerical, and mid-level service work, face a narrowing set of options as automation and offshoring compress the very employment categories they occupy.

At the firm level, the same digital transition is generating trust deficits that many managers have not yet recognized as such. Surveillance-linked remote work, opaque algorithmic management, exclusionary upskilling, and technology rollouts imposed without consultation all produce the same underlying effect: workers who distrust management's intentions, disengage from their roles, and contribute less than they are capable of contributing.

The advisories laid out in this paper are not about slowing down technology adoption. They are about managing it in ways that retain the human capital organizations and economies need to function. Transparent communication, inclusive training, outcome-based accountability, human oversight of algorithms, participatory governance, and sustained attention to psychological safety are not soft measures. They are the practical conditions under which digital transitions actually deliver the productivity and innovation gains they promise.

For researchers and policymakers working on human capital development in hybrid economies, the message is similar. Technology policy that does not address the distributional effects of skill polarization will produce digital dividends for some and deeper marginalization for others. The goal should not simply

be to get more workers online. It should be to build the institutions, training systems, and workplace practices that allow workers at every skill level to participate in and benefit from the digital economy.

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