ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to analyze how globalization has influenced the spread of different social movements, with a peculiar focus on gender issues, the Islamist expansion and the Gandhian nonviolence repertoire and self-immolation. These particular social movements were chosen due to their heterogeneity as they entail different contents (central claims being made) and repertoires (forms of manifestation).

If the Islamist movement, the Gandhian repertoire of nonviolence and self-immolation have reached a global level due to conscious actions undertaken by leaders and networks of followers spreading from the less developed to the more developed regions of the globalized world, the plight of gender equality seems to follow a different pattern. Many of the positive outcomes connected with the feminist movement (such as a better economic situation for women, better job market penetration, more equal wages) stem not necessarily from conscious and coordinated actions (although these were often organized and contributed) but can largely be seen as secondary outcomes (spill-overs) of FDI penetration and trade openness. In brief, once western companies relocated to new eastern/southern locations they required female labor force and were more inclined to offer more equal payment than local capitalist/companies. As such, the higher level of gender equality brought by globalization in the ‘poor South’ was largely an unintended effect or a positive externality of FDI penetration and the more gender inclusive labor practices of western companies.

Keywords: globalization, social movements, transnational diffusion, gender equality.

1. Introduction

The era of globalization has facilitated, via FDI and trade openness, the creation of a global market in which economic and financial production and demand surpass both national and geographical boundaries. Furthermore, the global economic market also lead way to a global cultural market in which ideas, values, cultural products and ideologies became less of a local nature and more of a global one.

One particular interesting aspect of the global cultural market refers to the diffusion (or spread) of social movements between what is traditionally called the rich North (largely comprised of USA and Western Europe) and the poor south (China, India and Africa as a whole). The ‘classical diffusion theory’ which assumes that ‘innovations originate in the Western core and enter receptive communities on the non-Western periphery’ (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 700) seems
to be refuted by recent evidence of transnational diffusion\(^\text{1}\) of social movements and repertoires which follow a different flow or spread. However, one of the most prominent social movements, namely the gender equality (feminist) movements seems to obey the classical North-South direction, as the penetration of FDI and increased trade openness changed the status quo of females in (investments) receiving countries.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how globalization has generated and influenced the spread of different social movements, with a peculiar focus on gender issues, the Islamist expansion and the Gandhian nonviolence repertoire and self-immolation. These particular social movements were chosen due to their heterogeneity as they entail different contents (central claims being made) and repertoires (forms of manifestation). Section 2 will present the main theoretical framework referring to a better understanding of globalization (in subsection 2.1) and the transnational diffusion of social movements. Section 3 presents evidence that social movements and forms of protest can divert from the traditional accepted flow, in the sense that they originate in the South (periphery, poor, less developed regions) and then spread to the North (center, rich, developed regions). The argument will be made for two different social movements, namely the Gandhian nonviolence repertoire and self-immolation (in subsection 3.1) and the Islamist expansion (in subsection 3.2). Section 4 is dedicated to the relationship between gender issues and globalization, as it tries to identify the pros and cons of globalization for the overall feminist movements and economic gender inequality in particular. Lastly, Section 5 concludes by reviewing the main findings of this research and proposing further lines of inquiry.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Globalization

Globalization, unlike the other central concepts used in this paper seems to present a higher degree of uncertainty as it cannot be reduced to a ‘single concept that can be defined and encompassed within a set time frame, nor is it a process that can be defined clearly with a beginning and an end’ (Al-Rodhan & Stoudmann 2006, p. 3). In essence, any attempt to define globalization must refer to the following issues (together or in different combinations): (a) economic integration; (b) the transfer of policies across borders; (c) the transmission of knowledge (ideas); (d) cultural stability; (e) the reproduction, relations, and discourses of power; and (f) ‘an establishment of the global market free from sociopolitical control’ (Al-Rodhan & Stoudmann 2006, p. 3; Nikitin & Elliott 2000, p. 14). Reviewing multiple and often conflicting definitions of globalization, Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006, p. 5) propose the following generalization of globalization as ‘a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities’.

The International Monetary Fund however, emphasizes the economic and financial aspects of globalization, arguing that ‘Globalization refers to the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology’ (1997, p. 45). Similar economic and financial aspects are stressed by OECD (1993, p. 7), globalization being understood as ‘the phenomenon by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and the flows of capital and technology’. A similar point of view focused of economic issues is also shared by Spich (1995, p. 7) as ‘Globalization is a conceptualization of the international political economy which suggests and believes essentially that all economic activity, whether local, regional or national, must be conducted within a perspective and attitude that constantly is global and worldwide in its scope’. Another economic oriented definition is presented by Henderson as the ‘...free movement of goods, services, labor and capital thereby creating a single market in inputs and outputs; and full national treatment for foreign investors (and nationals working abroad) so that, economically speaking, there are no foreigners’ (1999, p. 14)

\(^{1}\) Particular elements such as the political opportunity structure, framing (Tarrow 2005; 2011), constraints (Kirton 2002) and so on, which are otherwise essential for the study of transnational diffusion had to be downplayed in the context of this paper due to space limitations.
For other authors such as Wallerstein (1974) the term receives ideological valences and relates to the future shape of the world economy as ‘globalization represents the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of labour’. Similar views are expressed by Steingard and Fitzgibbons (1995) which understand ‘globalization as an ideological construct devised to satisfy capitalism’s need for new markets and labour sources and propelled by the uncritical ‘sycophancy’ of the international academic business community’. On the same ideological narrative, others argue that globalization might not be connected with real economic forces, but rather with rhetoric, construct and ideology as ‘…globalization is not an output of the ‘real’ forces of markets and technologies, but is rather an input in the form of rhetorical and discursive constructs, practices and ideologies which some groups are imposing on others for political and economic gain’ (Walck & Bilimoria 1995, p. 3).

Giddens on the other hand links globalization to social relations and a shrinkage of geographic distances, referring to globalization as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (1990, p. 64) or as ‘not only, or even primarily, about economic interdependence, but about the transformation of time and space in our lives’ (Giddens 1998, pp. 30-31). A similar idea of geographical shrinkage can also be found in the works of Kiely and Marfleet (1998, p. 3) as globalization leads to ‘…a world in which societies, cultures, politics and economics have, in some sense, come closer together’. Furthermore, McGrew (1998, p. 327) views globalization as something more than ‘a process which generates flows and connections, not simply across nation-states and national territorial boundaries, but between global regions, continents and civilizations’, leading towards ‘an historical process which engenders a significant shift in the spatial reach of networks and systems of social relations to transcontinental or interregional patterns of human organization, activity and the exercise of power’. According to Larsson (2001, p. 9) globalization ‘is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world’.

Dicken tries to define globalization by contrast/comparison with internationalization as ‘a more advanced and complex form of internationalization which implies a degree of functional integration between internationally dispersed economic activities’ (1992, p. 1) and ‘the degree of interdependence and integration between national economies’ (1992, p. 87). Nonetheless, globalization can also be conceptualized as a political backlash or response against the expansion of market power: ‘As experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally… and in culture, a devaluation of a collective’s achievements… Globalization is emerging as a political response to the expansion of market power… a domain of knowledge’ (Mittelman 2000, pp. 6-7).

2.2. Transnational diffusion of social movements

Transnational diffusion can be understood as ‘the spread of similar forms of action and similar claims across borders’ (Tarrow 2011, p. 405), ‘the transfer of claims or forms of contention from one site to another’ (Tarrow 2005, p. 32) or ‘transfer in the same or similar shape of forms and claims of contention across space or across sectors and ideological divides’ (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2004, p. 68). Other authors would refer to it as: (1) ‘a political process in which actors at different levels use adoption and adaptation of foreign examples to make national and transnational claims and change institutional and legal settings, build alliances and exert pressure. Strategic framing efforts are central in shaping this political process and [...] are crucial in allocating power and positions in this process’ (Roggeband 2010, p. 2); or, (2) ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system’ (Rogers 1995, p. 5).

Having shed some light upon what transnational diffusion is just the beginning. To fully grasp this concept additional questions have to be answered: How does diffusion happen? What can be diffused? From where to where does diffusion take place?
According to Tarrow, diffusion can be classified according to the pathways/channels by which the transfer is realized:

- (1) direct/relational diffusion refers to the transfer of information along established lines of interaction through networks of trust (between individuals that know each other) or formed around mutual advantage (or individual that find a common ground – ethnic or religious identity, facing the same issue and so on) (2011, pp. 435-438; 2005, pp. 101-117);
- (2) indirect/non-relational diffusion refers to the transfer of new forms of contention or participation among individuals that lack strong social ties through media (radio, television, print and the internet) or ‘word-of-mouth’ (2011, pp. 435-438; 2005, pp. 101-117);
- (3) mediated diffusion that refers to spreading new forms of contention or participation via the actions of ‘brokers’ or mediators such as NGO’s, donor institutions or supranational actors (2011, pp. 435-438; 2005, pp. 101-117).

A second classification can be made according to what can be diffused (Kriesi et al. 1995, pp. 185-187): (1) the content of mobilization refers to ‘a particular goal, issue, theme, idea, slogan which is adopted by a new actor and articulated in a different context’; (2) the form of organization refers to the characteristics of the internal structure (the division of tasks, the administrative form, or the degree of centralization or professionalization) of a social movement organization; (3) the form of action refers to repertoires that can be adopted once they have proven their efficacy in a different context; and (4) the model of action and likely effects of collective action refer to the adoption of a movement mobilization pattern by others due to the perceived chances of success.

Last, but most important for the purpose of this paper, the geographical spread of social movements (claims, repertoires and organizations) across borders must be brought into the picture. A great deal of the 1990’s and early 2000 literature seems to accept diffusion as ‘a one direction hierarchic process, from transmitter to receiver, from center to periphery, from ‘advanced’ to ‘less developed’ actors or contexts’ (Roggeband 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, the assumption ‘that today’s turbulent world basically emanates from developments in Europe, the United States, and other Western democracies’ seems to be unexamined as (1) transnational diffusion is seen as ‘the logical result of global institutional isomorphism’ and (2) most scholars do not question globalizations geographical source’ (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 698).

Classical diffusion theorists are explicit when referring to the pattern of geographical spread: diffusion within peasant communities generally flows from pro-development cosmopolitans to traditionalist laggards (in the West). Furthermore, innovation disseminate from the developed West to and within ‘underdeveloped’ rural areas outside the west (Rogers 1995), from ‘modern’ opinion leaders at the top of the social hierarchy to ‘traditional’ followers at the bottom (Chabot & Duyvendak, 2002, p. 700). It should be noted that such a view regarding the transmission of social movements may hold some truth if we refer to (not limited):

1. women’s rights (sexual harassment, gender mainstreaming) (Roggeband 2010; True & Mintrom 2001),
2. environmentalism (Kirton 2002),
3. sexual minority rights (Kriesi et al. 1995),
4. mediators (NGO’s, private donors and state agents) from the North that subsidize grass root movements and activist from the South (Pommerolle & Simeant 2010; Tarrow 2011, pp. 413-416).

However, opposite flows of claims, repertoires and organizations can also be observed if we refer to: (1) Islamist groups emerging from the Middle East that ‘multiplied into a number of autonomous groups in North Africa, the Middle East and even in Western Europe’ (Tarrow 2011, p.

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3 Kriesi et al. (1995, p. 185) downplay the role of mediators and identify only two channels of diffusion: direct (formal or informal) and indirect (via mass media).
4 For a better description of how mass media can facilitate the diffusion of social movements see Kolb (2005).

Although the list of movements and repertoires that diffused from the North to the South is more than generous, I will present only a couple of such phenomena, as the aim of this paper is to also focus on the reverse spread.
417; ) or (2) repertoire such as (2a) ‘the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk in 1963’ which ‘created a model that was borrowed in many different countries, across various cultures’ (Biggs 2005, p. 173), (2b) ‘the Gandhian repertoire of nonviolence (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002; Tarrow 2005, pp. 106-113), (2c) suicide bombers (generally connected with extreme Islamic movements since the 1980’s and IRA in the 1990’s).

3. From the ‘poor’ South to the ‘rich’ North: Gandhian nonviolence repertoire, self-immolation and Islamism expansion

3.1. Gandhian nonviolence repertoire and self-immolation

Nonviolence can be understood as a set of ‘aggressive measures to constraint or punish opponents and to win concessions through disruptive but not violent means’ (Ackerman & DuVall, cited in Tarrow 2005, p. 107). The ‘Gandhian repertoire of nonviolence’ first appeared in Johannesburg in 1906 at a mass meeting of Indians in South Africa as individuals collectively pledged to disobey the Draft Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 709). The repertoire was diffused to India in 1915 by Gandhi, who changed it from ‘a protest method for seeking minority rights and political reform to a militant weapon aimed at expelling the British Empire from India’ using boycotts, strikes, non-cooperation and civil disobedience. The movement also entailed new organizational stiles (self-sufficient communes, loose associations with permanent organizations, community service, purification, and strict guidelines for behavior and strategy) and a new discursive language (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 710; Chabot 2004).

By the end of 1930s, religious pacifists and civil rights activists from the United States traveled to India in an attempt to meet with Gandhi and learn about his nonviolent repertoire with the hope of being able to apply the same forms of protests to advance their own claims. While the nonviolence repertoire reached its demise in India, it began to take root in the United States as during the 1940s US activists engaged themselves in the first Gandhian experiments (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 711). Although unsuccessful at first, a second wave of Gandhian repertoire (the bus boycott following the arrest of a black female who refused to give her place to a white male) was used during the mid-1950s by African American communities in Montgomery (Time 1956); the process continued over the next years (during the student sit-ins of 1960 and the Freedom Ride of 1961) until 1965 (Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, p. 711; Chabot 2004; Andrews & Biggs 2006, p. 771).

However, the story of nonviolent repertoire (which has spread from Africa to India and the USA) didn’t end in the 1960s and took a new journey back towards the periphery (or semi-periphery) as it was successfully used in the post socialist context in the mid-1990s. Following the 1996 elections a wave of contention gradually engulfed Serbia, as a unified opposition and different layers of society opposed Milosevic’s practices. Both Otpor (a student movement that opposed Milosevic’s attempts to control universities) and the political opposition adopted nonviolent strategies (peaceful demonstrations) to keep pressure on Milosevic (Tarrow 2005, pp. 109-111). The ‘Otpor model’ diffused furthermore from the Balkans to the Caucasus after the Georgian president rigged the 2003 parliamentary elections; three weeks of peaceful street protests followed and culminated with a ‘March of the Angry Voters’. Yet again, the political opposition joined forces with a student group (Kmara) and engaged in a coordinated struggle to force the President to step down, using nonviolent forms of manifestation such as graffiti, leaflet and poster campaigns against corruption, police brutality and also promoting media freedom (Tarrow 2005, pp. 112-113).

Departing from the nonviolent repertoire presented above, the transnational diffusion of self-immolation seems to follow a similar pattern, originating in the South and then spreading toward the North. According to Biggs, ‘an act of self-immolation involves an individual intentionally killing himself or herself (or at least gambling with death) on behalf of a collective cause’ (2005, p. 173). Self-immolation is an extreme act of protest intended to be public (performed in the public sphere in the view of other people or accompanied by a statement made to political figures or the general public) and can be individual or coordinated between a group of individuals (Biggs 2005, pp. 173-174). It is estimated that between 1963 and 2000 there have been between 800 and 3,000 individual acts of self-immolation (including failed attempts), all of them...
seeming to originate from Quang Ducs’ 1963 self-immolation (in Saigon); the majority of this phenomena ‘were modeled either directly on his action or indirectly on another’s action that can in turn be traced back to him’ (Biggs 2005, p. 174).

In the following years after Quang Duc self-immolation, his model of protest started to diffuse across the globe, facilitated by the extensive media coverage such practices received. In 1964 in India, a Tamil worker set himself alight to protest against the encroachment of the Hindi language and the attempts to make it the official language of India. In 1965, a South Korea politician set himself on fire in order to protest against the country’s first post-war treaty with Japan. However, the diffusion did not limit itself to the periphery: such practices started to occur in the United States (where there was no precedent either for politically motivated sacrifice or for death by fire). In 1965, as discontent was rising against the Vietnam War, Alice Herz, (an elderly Quaker), set herself on fire to protest against American foreign policy and her example was followed several months later by Norman Morrison (another Quaker). A couple of days later, Roger LaPorte ‘assumed the lotus position and set himself alight outside the United Nations’ (Biggs 2005, p. 181). Just two years after ‘the original act of Quang Duc’ ‘self-immolation had entered the global repertoire of protest’ (this form of protest diffused to the Soviet Union, Malaysia and Japan and further cases were observed in the United States and Vietnam). In 1969 self-immolations began to be used in order to support other claims: Jan Palach set himself alight to protest against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia; six others followed in Hungary, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia – the model of sacrificial protest by self-immolation was now a form of protest available for any cause (Biggs 2005, pp. 181-182).

Although compared with suicidal terrorism, self-immolation has diffused more widely around the world, there appears to be some sort of a clustering of self-immolation, since there are no reported cases from Africa or Middle East; although self-immolation is present in those regions, it is not used as a form of protest, but rather as a form of suicide determined by personal reasons (Sands 2010; Shakeri et al. 2007).  

3.2. Movements and repertoires: the Islamist expansion

According to Tarrow the ‘most powerful transnational social movement in the world today’ is comprised by ‘the loose archipelago of Islamist groups that emerged from the Middle East’ in the 1970s and 1980s (2011, p. 417). The Islamic movement started by inspiring a number of political parties in the Middle East: from the 258 parliamentary elections that have been held in Muslim societies over the past 40 years, 86 involved at least one Islamic party or movement (including movements that run candidates as independents), while thirty-two of these elections involved two or more Islamic parties (Kurzman & Naqvi 2009, p. 5). Furthermore, Islamic parties spread (with time) from the Middle East to Western established democracies such as Great Britain (the Islamic Party of Britain from 1989) (Islamic Party of Britain 2005) or Spain (the Partido Renacimiento y Unión de España from 2010) (Ramos & Ramo 2013).

Secondly, the movement gave rise to different terrorist cells that eventually congealed into the Al-Qaeda network (Tarrow 2011, p. 417). Al-Qaeda (‘the base’)

\[^5\] was established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988, near the end of the war in Afghanistan, fashioned out of an organization called the ‘Services Office (Maktab al-Khidamat)’, which had the purpose of absorbing, placing and managing the volunteers who came to Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 (from around the Muslim world) in order to fight alongside the local ‘mujahidin’ against the Soviet army (Keppel & Milelli 2008, pp. 11-20; Atwan 2008, pp. 39-63). After the war ended and the Soviet troops withdraw, al-Qaeda began to operate as an independent organization comprised primarily of war veterans, who formed a class of ‘Afghan alumni’ and new generations of fighters trained in camps established by Bin Laden (Schweitzer and Feber 2005, pp. 15-16; Keppel & Milelli, 2008, pp. 20-23). In the first years al-Qaeda functioned primarily as an ideological center and conduit for financial and logistical assistance to terrorist groups and networks that aspired to actualize the concept of

\[^5\] Further (statistical) data of the geographic distribution of self-immolation is available in Biggs 2005, p. 185.

\[^6\] For further details see Wander (2008).
‘jihad’ in countries like Egypt, Algeria, Somalia and the United States. In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda acquired the reputation of assisting terrorist attacks carried out by others (it was connected with terrorist and guerrilla attacks around the world, including the attacks on American tourists in Aden in 1992 and on American forces in Somalia in 1993, the attack on the Twin Towers in 1993). Its independent terrorist activity began in August 1998, as Bin Laden decided that his organization had reached organizational and operational maturity and set up a base in protective territory that provided him with the ability to plan and prepare. In February 1998 Bin Laden announced the establishment of an Islamic umbrella group, with al-Qaeda at its center, known as the ‘International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders’. This framework organization was meant to band together terrorist organizations and networks that already had some kind of ideological or operational partnership (Schweitzer & Feber 2005, p. 17).

If al-Qaeda was considered to be under the control of Bin Laden, links with affiliates not under his direct command have been complex and are far from a uniform paradigm; while grouped loosely under the generic label of Al-Qaeda, these affiliates are in fact independent organizations with varying degrees of ideological and operational association with the core group. They have included terrorist networks (formed on an ad hoc basis specifically to carry out attacks) based to a large degree on the operational knowledge and experience acquired by their members at training camps in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda commanders have usually not been involved operationally in the planning and execution of attacks carried out by these affiliates. Terrorist attacks have tended to be carried out under the authority of commanders of local terrorist networks (e.g.: the networks that participated in the 1993 attack on the Twin Towers, the terrorist networks in Europe - such as the Milani network that planned attacks in Germany in December 2000 and the Begal network that planned to operate in France but was captured in July 2001).

Al-Qaeda’s links with established Islamic terrorist groups around the world are based both on commanders’ shared ideology and their shared military experiences in Afghanistan (veterans of the war in Afghanistan assumed command positions within local terrorist organizations upon returning to their countries of origin but also maintained their connections with al-Qaeda commanders). Established terrorist groups operated autonomously, usually within the borders of their home countries, and included: branches of al-Jama’a al-Islamiya in a number of Asian countries; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; Lashkar al-Toiba, Jaysh Muhammad, and Harakat al-Ansar in India; al-Itkihad al-Islami in Somalia; Usbat al-Ansar in Lebanon; the Islamic Army of Aden in Yemen; and many others. Despite their autonomy, the groups or individual activists within them periodically cooperated with Al-Qaeda when preparing terrorist attacks, as in the cooperation between Al-Qaeda and the MILF, Abu Sayyaf, and al-Jama’a al-Islamiya in the attempted Singapore attack of December 2001 and the attack in Bali in October 2002 (Schweitzer & Feber 2005, pp. 18-19; Atwan 2008).

A major change in Al-Qaeda’s relationship with its affiliates resulted from the war against terror declared by the international coalition in response to the attacks of September 11. Until September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda consisted of five components: (1) a small structure of ‘operators’ and ‘planners’ working out of camps and traveling to different locations around the world; (2) cadres of suicide terrorists ready for operations who would vacate their places for others; (3) clerics and other agents of influence throughout the world instituting a program of indoctrination regarding the concept of self-sacrifice; (4) businessmen and philanthropists from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that financed such ventures and (5) sleeper cells in Western countries that remained in contact with the headquarters in Afghanistan (Schweitzer & Feber 2005, pp. 19-20). The ‘war on terror’ struck a serious blow to al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan, causing the death of many of the group’s fighters and commanders and placing group members and leaders under international siege. Al-Qaeda commanders were forced to adapt to the new situation by going underground and dispersing their operatives in different locations; as a result, the center of gravity of activity of the global ‘jihad’ moved gradually from Al-Qaeda to its affiliate organizations, which continued to employ suicide attacks as their primary mode of operation (Schweitzer & Feber 2005, p. 20; Tarrow 2005, p. 101), even after the death of the initial leader.
Beside the previous short narrative of al-Qaeda’s development and connections with allies and affiliates, the most compelling evidence vis-à-vis the spread of the Muslim movement is the geographical distribution of suicide attacks connected with this movement. From an organization that originated in Afghanistan, by mid-2000, al-Qaeda extended its influence and claims in the West (USA, UK, Spain), South (Tanzania and Kenya), East (Philippines, Singapore) and North (Sweden’, Turkey and Russia) (Schweitzer & Feber 2005).

Although they are best known for such violent attacks against people and property, Islamist groups engage in a wide variety of forms of action: (1) the ability to gain new adherents through the mass media and the internet (Tarrow 2011, p. 417), (2) organizing adherents and leaders in political parties (as showed above), (3) peaceful protests and manifestations (such as the July 2010 protest in Cardiff against ‘anti-Islam laws’ (BBC News 2010), the March 2010 London Muslim student protests over the closure of ‘prayer room’ (Newman 2010), the Muslim protests over the Danish caricatures of Mohammed in 2006 (BBC News 2006; Quiano 2006).

4. From the ‘rich’ North to the ‘poor’ South: gender equality

If the previously analyzed social movements seem to have reached a global level due to conscious actions undertaken by leaders and networks of followers spreading from the poor to the rich sectors of the globalized world, the plight of gender equality seems to follow a different pattern. Many of its ultimate results (such as a better economic situation for women, better job market penetration, more equal wages) stem not necessarily from conscious and coordinated actions (although these were often organized) but largely as a secondary outcome of FDI penetration and trade openness. In brief, once western companies relocated to new western production capabilities they required female labor force and were inclined to ensure more equal payment than local capitalists/companies. As such, the higher level of gender equality brought by globalization in the poor South was largely an unintended effect or a spill-over of FDI penetration and the more gender considerate labor practices of western companies. Freeman (2001, pp. 1007-1037) argues that gender issues have been consistently downplayed when analyzing globalization and its effects even if gender has a central role in the configuration of global production and consuming. The role of feminist analysis in the understanding of international development and globalization is also brought up by Beneria (2003) and Angeles (2002); the later posits that ‘Feminist scholars have played a critical role in using gender lenses in policy analysis and shaping policy alternatives’ (Angeles 2002, p. 22).

Rinaldo (2011, p. 539) provides empirical evidence that both the global discourses of feminism and Islamic revivalism are mediated through national organizations which shape women’s political activism and channel it in different directions; thus women’s political subjectivities are often shaped through their involvement in national organizations that structure the ways in which they engage with global discourses. For Acker (2004, p. 17), gender processes and ideologies are inherently embedded in globalizing capitalism via: (1) the separation of capitalist production and human reproduction and the corporate claims to non-responsibility for reproduction, (2) the important role of hegemonic masculinities in globalizing processes, and (3) in the ways that gender serves as a resource for capital. Heintz (2006, p. iii) offers evidence that current policy frameworks stress a macroeconomic stability, freer markets, a smaller role for the public sector and uninhibited international flows of capital and goods, but does not extend the same privilege to labor, thus negatively effecting females.

While analyzing economic policy proposals and initiatives, Çağatay and Ertürk (2004, p. v) reveal a contradictory process, as the world economy (as a result of globalization) has produced

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7 Although Sweden is not present on the map included in Schweitzer & Feber (2005, p. 62) references about the 2010 suicide bomber from Stockholm, linked to al-Qaeda, can be found in Black (2010) and Ward and Blitz (2010).

8 The authors also argue that gender mainstreaming in these spheres of policy-making can only be undertaken meaningfully if there is a shift in the current policy stance towards people centered policies, a break from the mentality of trickledown economics and recognition of the significance of progressive
neither sustained growth rates, nor significant poverty reduction over the past two decades and just as growth does not automatically trickle down to poor households, nor do income increases in poor households automatically trickle down to women and girls. The effects of globalization have been gender-differentiated due to the differences between men and women in terms of access to (and control over) assets and economic resources, while many countries and governments in the South lack the resources and mechanisms to protect those who have lost livelihoods in the context of globalization. Radović-Marković (2012) provides evidence that globalization has influenced organizational culture and, consequently, the behavior of individuals and the gender roles attributed to males and females. A similar argument is presented by a True (2003), arguing that globalization had an important role in the economic transition of post-communist states as the privatization of a formerly state economy and the adoption of consumer-oriented market practices were shaped by ideas and attitudes about gender roles, thus leading to outcomes biased against females.

Moghadam argues that the various dimensions of globalization (economic, political, and cultural) led to negative gender effects such as inequalities in the global economy and the continued hegemony of the core, the feminization of labor, the withering away of the developmentalist/welfare state, the rise of identity politics and other forms of particularism, the spread of concepts of human rights and women's rights, and the proliferation of women's organizations and transnational feminist networks (1999, p. 367). However, on the contrast of globalization's dire economic effects, the process has created a new constituency of working women, thus organizing women who may create a potent anti-systemic movement (1999, p. 367). Radović-Marković (2009, p. 26) argues that women in the informal sector (underground economy) face more often gender discrimination in the form of lower pay, lack of access to resources such as capital, education, and training and are excluded from the policy-making process. However, the macro- and micro-economic policies entailed by globalization (including structural adjustment) do not take these factors and their negative impacts on women into account, thus leading to a more precarious status for women (Radović-Marković 2009, p. 26). In the case of India, Rashmeni (2012, p. 147) observes that at the sub-national level higher per capita income is accompanied with lower gender inequality, even in some high income states gender inequality also remains very high (high gender inequality was also observed in the states which score high in the trade openness index – as such, higher income or economic/trade openness does not automatically lead to lower inequality). Raigrodski (2015) draws attention that globalization and especially labor migration might have a detrimental effect of women as it can provide a context in which trafficking in persons might thrive.

In the context of globalization, Oostendorp (2009, pp. 141-161) observes that the occupational gender wage gap tends to decrease with increasing economic development (at least in richer countries), and to decrease with trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in richer countries. However the same argument cannot be made for poorer countries as there is no evidence that trade and FDI also reduce the occupational gender wage gap (Oostendorp 2009, pp. 141-161). Chen et al. (2013, pp. 256-266) use an enterprise-population-level dataset to investigate the link between globalization and gender inequality in the Chinese labor market and observe that foreign and exporting firms employ more female workers than domestic non-exporters; furthermore, foreign participation and export orientation within the same region and industry significantly encourage female employment and reduce the gender wage gap. The authors also find statistical evidence that even if a large gender wage gap can be observed for foreign and exporting firms, this is mainly the result of difference in gender productivity and not a result of discrimination, while classical gender wage discrimination is observed only among private non-exporting firms (Chen et al. 2013, pp. 256-266), that often lack any foreign connections/partnerships.

Neumayer and de Soysa (2011, pp. 1065-1075) analyzed if the spatial dependence theory in the case of gender (the higher women’s economic and social rights in foreign countries with which

redistributive policies at the national and international levels, including gender-wise redistributive policies.
a country is connected via trade and FDI spill-over into higher rights among the laggards) can be sustained by empirical data. The authors analyzed women’s rights over the 1981-2007 period in a global sample (and sub-samples of countries at different stages of economic development) and found consistent evidence for spill-over effects via trade links - with the exception of some low-income countries. The authors found evidence for similar effects via FDI, but only for economic rights and only in middle-income countries (Neumayer & de Soysa 2011, pp. 1065-1075).

Potrafke and Ursprung (2012, pp. 399-413) offer an empirical perspective on the influence of globalization on social institutions that govern female subjugation and gender equality in developing countries by observing the progress of globalization for almost one hundred developing countries at ten year intervals, starting since 1970. According to their results ‘economic and social globalization exert a decidedly positive influence on the social institutions that reduce female subjugation and promote gender equality’ (2013, p. 399). Figure 1 shows the causal mechanism and relations between globalization and gender, while underlining another beneficial outcome, namely economic growth. According to Figure 1, globalization can directly foster economic growth via FDI penetration and trade openness (arrow 1) and it can also lead to higher gender equality as investor create new jobs for women and ensure more gender friendly work environments (at least when compared to local entrepreneurs) (arrow 2). Furthermore, globalization can also entice policy makers to create institutions that foster gender equality (arrow 3) and the gender empowering institution created by national legislative as a result of international cooperation (globalization) further improve the situation of women in society and the labor force, leading to gender equality (arrow 4). Lastly, more gender equal societies where both men and female contribute to economic life increase the economic output and ensure sustainable growth (arrow 5).

![Figure 1: The nexus between globalization, gender equality, and growth.](Source: Potrafke & Ursprung (2012, p. 401)

Black and Brainerd (2004) (p. 540), try to test if increased product market competition will drive out gender discrimination in the long run by examining the impact of globalization on gender discrimination in manufacturing industries. Comparing the change in the gender wage gap between 1976 and 1993 in concentrated versus competitive manufacturing industries (using the latter as a control for changes in the gender wage gap that are unrelated to competitive pressures) they observe that (1) although trade increases wage inequality by modestly reducing the relative wages of less-skilled workers, (2) at the same time it appears to benefit women by reducing the ability of firms to discriminate against them.

Since concentrated industries face little competitive pressure, an increase in competition from trade should theoretically reduce the residual gender wage gap more in these industries than in competitive industries.
Tseloni, Tsoukisb and Emmanouilidesc (2011) investigate how globalization and socio-economic development are linked to three indices of gender inequality (gender differences in secondary school enrolment, unemployment, and labor force participation) and employ multivariate multilevel modeling to also investigate the interdependence between these gender gaps. Their results show that, when controlling for non-linear trends and other predictors, labor force participation and unemployment gaps did not greatly vary within countries during the last fifth of the 20th century – thus most economic gender differences are predominately between countries (2011, p. 20). Their findings also imply that, to a small degree, regional attitudes shape women’s decisions for (or against) economic activity but are unrelated to their relative human capital and unemployment (2011, p. 20). As such, in countries with larger female unemployment compared to male, girls (or rather their families on their behalf) seek more formal education to perhaps increase their chances of finding and keeping a job (Tseloni, Tsoukisb & Emmanouilidesc 2011, p. 20).

Sen (2010) argues that even if gender wage gaps and worsening terms of employment, including the distribution of benefits like social security and maternity rights, are all valid concerns when discussing globalization and what it may entail, official statistics on gender gaps in employment and wages fail to highlight some aspects of gender deprivation in the labor market and at workplaces (as well as within households). The latter which have to be taken into account relate to relational characteristics between the two sexes (such as hierarchy, dependence, and power in patriarchy) are often left outside the purview of economics, the data set, and the policies generated from there (Sen 2010, p. 11).

5. Conclusions

Globalization entails, beside the creation of a global market in which economic and financial production and demand surpass both national and geographical boundaries, the realization of a global cultural market in which ideas, values, cultural products and ideologies became less of a local nature and more of a global one.

Although cultural goods and movements can travel across borders and vast geographic distances, similar to economic goods/movements, the directions in which they spread as well as their core contents and repertoires tend to differ greatly. While the Islamist movement, the Gandhian repertoire of nonviolence and self-immolation originated in the South and then spread (diffused) consciously to the North (and in some cases to other less-developed and developing regions), the feminist movement originated in the North and spread both consciously and unconsciously (as a spillover of economic practices and FDI penetration) to the South.

There are further lines of inquiry which can be derived from the present research. One such still unexplored avenue would be to analyze the influence of globalized values in contrast to local culture and their interplay in reducing or increasing gender equality. Furthermore, the potential backlash from feminism in the face of globalization (as not everything related to globalization has improved the status quo for women – i.e. sexual trafficking, population displacements) might become an interesting and pressing topic in the near future.

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